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REVISITING OUR ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Benjamin E. Rosenberg* 
 
I recall feeling shocked when I first read Judge Gerard E. Lynch’s 1998 
article, “Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice.”1  Although I 
recognized its description of how the criminal justice system worked, the 
shock came from the context in which Judge Lynch placed his observations.  
He pointed out what had been in front of me, unacknowledged all along:  
that our adversarial system of criminal justice was not adversarial at all.  
Instead, he posited that it resembled the European system of administrative 
criminal law, which had long been considered the alternative to our system 
of criminal justice, not its cousin.  Judge Lynch further suggested that 
perhaps the European administrative system of criminal justice was not so 
bad, that we might learn something from it, and that we might continue to 
adopt some of its most attractive features. 
Nineteen years after Judge Lynch’s piece, this Article considers recent 
developments in the criminal justice system and whether Judge Lynch’s 
observations have withstood the test of time.  It suggests that Judge Lynch’s 
observation—that our criminal justice system has strayed far from the 
model of the adversarial system—remains as true today as it was when he 
made it in 1998.  It further explains that developments in the nineteen years 
since the publication of “Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice” 
have caused the criminal justice system to stray even further from the 
adversarial model and in ways that Judge Lynch may not have anticipated.  
The Article concludes with a discussion of the shortcomings of our 
administrative system, and it offers suggestions for ways it might be 
improved. 
 
*  Partner, Dechert LLP.  Former General Counsel, New York County District Attorney’s 
Office.  The views expressed in this Article are the author’s own and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the District Attorney’s Office. 
 
 1. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2117 (1998).  When he wrote the article, Judge Lynch was a professor at Columbia 
Law School.  He was appointed as a federal district judge in the Southern District of New 
York in 2000, and in 2009, he was appointed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals where 
he now sits. See Gerard E. Lynch, COLUM. L. SCH., http://web.law.columbia.edu/ 
faculty/gerard-lynch (last visited Mar. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cc/G48P-9UET].  Although he 
was not a judge when he wrote “Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice,” this 
Article refers to him as Judge Lynch. 
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I.  JUDGE LYNCH ON OUR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Our criminal justice system is premised on an adversarial model in which 
prosecutors and defense attorneys face off, and the court acts as a neutral 
umpire and ultimately the decision maker on the guilt or innocence of 
defendants.2  The adversarial model is contrasted with the “inquisitorial” 
model used in Europe, among other places, in which only the judge 
investigates a case, prepares an extensive written record, and determines the 
defendant’s guilt or innocence.3 
The systems have their partisans and detractors, but the main point of 
“Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice” was not to champion one 
or the other.  Instead, it sought to show that our criminal justice system was 
no longer accurately described as an adversarial system, principally because 
of the plea bargaining process that had overwhelmed both the state and 
federal criminal justice systems.  It asserted that our system of justice more 
closely resembled the inquisitorial system than had previously been 
appreciated.4  Furthermore, the article argued that the resemblance was not 
necessarily something to be regretted, for there were potential advantages to 
the inquisitorial system.5 
Judge Lynch’s focus was on plea bargaining, which accounts for 
approximately 90 percent of criminal dispositions throughout the United 
States.6  He argued that plea bargaining was so prevalent that it could not be 
considered a mere exception to the standard trial-based adversarial model 
but had to be considered a part of the process itself.7  And, he argued, 
despite its name—which conjures up images of unprincipled back-and-
forths, with agreements reached solely on the basis of bargaining power, 
compromise, and expedience—plea bargaining was in many instances a 
fairly principled process.  Judge Lynch noted that in a plea bargaining 
negotiation, defense counsel puts forth reasoned arguments to prosecutors 
who—like their European counterparts—consider the evidence as both 
investigators and judges, and seek a just result consistent with those reached 
in similar cases.8  The result is most often a plea that the court simply, and 
 
 2. See Lynch, supra note 1, at 2118–19. 
 3. See id. at 2119 (describing the inquisitorial model).  Plainly, the description of both 
models is quite rough; there are doubtless significant variations among the different 
inquisitorial systems just as there are among the various states’ adversarial systems.  Nothing 
that follows in this Article depends, however, on any of those variations. 
 4. See id. at 2118 (“[T]he American system as it actually operates in most cases looks 
much more like what common lawyers would describe as a nonadversarial, administrative 
system of justice than like the adversarial model they idealize.”). 
 5. See id. at 2141–45. 
 6. See id. at 2121 n.2; see also Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. 
REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-
people-plead-guilty/ (stating that 97 percent of criminal charges that are not dismissed are 
resolved through plea bargaining, and observing that “it is a rare state where plea bargains do 
not similarly account for the resolution of at least 95 percent of the felony cases that are not 
dismissed”) [https://perma.cc/X9JK-LL3Z]. 
 7. See Lynch, supra note 1, at 2141–42. 
 8. See id. at 2124–36. 
2017] REVISITING OUR ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 11 
 
relatively uncritically, accepts.  Thus, the adversarial system is replaced by 
the more consultative—and at times collaborative—relation between the 
defense counsel and the prosecutor.  This ultimately relegates the court to a 
less important role. 
Judge Lynch’s article was largely descriptive—he showed what every 
criminal lawyer knew was happening in the criminal justice system.  But, 
he placed it in a new context.  He suggested that we should not think about 
the criminal justice system simply by noting how far it deviated from the 
adversarial model (and bemoaning the deviation).  Instead, we should 
recognize our system’s evolution as one toward a competing system 
resembling the inquisitorial model.9  He further suggested that the system 
that had developed was not to be regretted and was perhaps preferable in 
some ways to the pure adversarial model.10  He also suggested ways in 
which the emerging system could be improved.11 
II.  FROM ADVERSARIAL TO INQUISITORIAL:  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
OUR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Criminal law practitioners will recognize the accuracy of Judge Lynch’s 
observations, regardless of whether they agree with his generally positive 
evaluation of them.  This part notes several developments that have pushed 
the criminal justice system even further in the direction of the inquisitorial 
system.  Although Judge Lynch explored some of these developments, 
several deserve special mention. 
A.  The Prosecution of Corporations 
That prosecutors can and, in appropriate circumstances, should prosecute 
corporate entities is hardly debatable.  It is well documented that, especially 
in complicated white-collar cases, the prosecution of corporations has a 
pattern:  the corporation learns of an investigation from prosecuting 
authorities, after which the corporation approaches the authorities and vows 
to aid in the investigation.12  The reason that a corporation would do so is 
simple.  At the conclusion of the investigation, it intends to tell the 
prosecutors either (1) there was no wrongdoing within its ranks, or (2) there 
was wrongdoing, but it was an aberration that has been rectified—for 
instance, the corporation might explain that the scoundrels who engaged in 
 
 9. See generally id. 
 10. See id. at 2141–45. 
 11. See id. at 2145–51. 
 12. See generally DAN K. WEBB ET AL., CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS (release 
37 2012) (describing the form of a typical corporate investigation); see also United States v. 
Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008) (describing the course of a corporate entity’s 
cooperation with the prosecution); WEBB ET AL., supra, § 4.03[4][b] (“Often, the impetus for 
a company to conduct an internal investigation is that it has learned that it is under a DOJ 
criminal investigation or SEC enforcement proceeding . . . .  In some instances, especially 
where the investigation has been conducted by outside independent counsel, law 
enforcement authorities may give substantial deference to an investigation report, findings 
and remedial plan of action.”). 
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the wrongdoing have been dismissed or disciplined, and the corporation has 
made amends.  Therefore, the corporation would argue, it should not be 
punished (at least, not harshly).13 
Corporate cooperation in criminal investigations is the norm, and it is 
undertaken precisely so that the corporation can avoid prosecution.14  The 
risk of prosecution is borne by the individuals at the corporation who are 
investigated zealously by both the corporation and outside counsel 
consisting of former prosecutors retained specially for the assignment.15  
Those investigators, unlike prosecutors, are not limited by federal 
constitutional constraints and thus have a heavy bludgeon to wield.  
Whereas individuals can assert their Fifth Amendment rights against state 
or federal investigators, it is unrealistic to expect them to refuse to speak 
when questioned by private counsel retained by their corporations.  
Individuals can refuse to cooperate but risk losing their job—a cost that 
many cannot afford.  The corporation can thus obtain potentially self-
incriminating statements from individuals in circumstances in which the 
government would not have been able to do so.  And, the corporation often 
turns over the fruits of its investigation—including those incriminating 
statements—to the government.  The government in effect outsources its 
investigation, and individuals have no effective recourse.16 
Corporate prosecutions do not align precisely with the adversarial-
inquisitorial fault line, but they do move prosecutors away from the 
standard adversarial model in at least two ways.  First, as noted above, the 
corporation becomes an adjunct prosecutor, helping the actual prosecutor’s 
office build a case against the responsible individuals.  Thus, there is a 
cooperative modus vivendi developed between the prosecutor and the 
corporation. 
Second, the prosecutor’s investigation of the corporation often ends in an 
agreement—either a plea or deferred prosecution agreement—with the 
corporation, and in many instances the agreement calls for some ongoing 
oversight of the corporation.17  For example, depending on the misbehavior 
 
 13. See, e.g., Stein, 541 F.3d at 136 (describing the government’s decision to dismiss the 
indictment against a corporate defendant in light of its cooperation). 
 14. See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis:  Why Have No High-Level Executives 
Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/ 
2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ (noting how corporate internal 
investigations routinely result in the government and corporations entering into “deferred 
prosecution agreement[s] that couple[] some immediate fines with the imposition of 
expensive but internal prophylactic measures” after which the case is over “for all practical 
purposes”) [https://perma.cc/T77L-3T5J]. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See id. 
 17. For example, the deferred prosecution agreements that the federal government 
reached with Deutsche Bank, Commerz Bank, and General Motors in 2015 included 
monitors. See Client Alert:  2015 Year-End Update on Corporate Non-Prosecution 
Agreements (NPAs) and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs), GIBSON, DUNN & 
CRUTCHER LLP, app. A at 23–30 (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/ 
documents/2015-Year-End-Update-Corporate-Non-Prosecution-Agreements-and-Deferred-
Prosecution-Agreements.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9QP-ZSQN].  For a useful compilation of 
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giving rise to the criminal investigation, the agreement may include 
oversight relating to appropriate accounting standards, disclosures, 
employment practices, or pollution controls.  While the plea negotiations 
between a prosecutor and an individual defendant are usually quite 
simple,18 the negotiations of the terms of an agreement between a 
prosecutor and a corporate defendant may be substantially more complex 
and cover numerous items.19  Such terms may include the standards of 
scrutiny to be used, who an appropriate monitor would be, and how often 
should the monitor be permitted to scrutinize the corporation.  Through this 
process, the prosecutor often becomes enmeshed in the details of the 
corporation’s business.  Accordingly, the prosecutor and the corporation’s 
lawyers work out an agreement in a far more profound and cooperative way 
than is allowed for in the adversarial model.20  And, the resulting agreement 
typically is far more detailed than a court can meaningfully review. 
B.  Baseless Pleas 
Judge Lynch was correct to emphasize the prevalence of pleas as 
evidence that our justice system was becoming more administrative and less 
adversarial.  Adding to that, however, is the prevalence of “baseless pleas,” 
or pleas for which there is no factual predicate but which are accepted by 
the court anyway.21 
Baseless pleas give prosecutors, defense counsel, and courts the 
flexibility to resolve cases in ways that they determine are fair or lenient to 
the defendant, even though such pleas may not be authorized by law.22  For 
example, a defendant who engages in conduct that might be prosecuted as 
drunk driving—typically a misdemeanor23—might plead to a lesser offense, 
say disorderly conduct—a violation24—thus resolving a case without the 
adverse consequences that a drunk driving conviction might bring.  The 
prosecutor may believe that the violation is an adequate punishment for the 
 
deferred prosecution agreements and nonprosecution agreements with corporate entities, see 
generally id. 
 18. The main point of contention in such negotiations is likely the severity of the 
punishment, usually measured in terms of months or years of incarceration or probation. 
 19. See, e.g., JAMES T. O’REILLY ET AL., PUNISHING CORPORATE CRIME 144 (2009) 
(stating that each deferred prosecution agreement or nonprosecution agreement is the 
“handcrafted” result of an “individual negotiation process between the relevant entity and the 
prosecutors”). 
 20. See id. at 145 (noting that deferred prosecution agreements and nonprosecution 
agreements “fall within the essentially unreviewable category of decisions for which there is 
substantial [and] almost unlimited prosecutorial discretion”); see also United States v. 
Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 738 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that the court had virtually 
no authority to refuse to accept a deferred prosecution agreement as such refusal would 
infringe upon the prosecutor’s discretion). 
 21. See Mari Byrne, Note, Baseless Pleas:  A Mockery of Justice, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2961, 2966–68 (2010). 
 22. See id. at 2972–74. 
 23. See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(2) (McKinney 2011); id. § 1193(1)(b) 
(Supp. 2017). 
 24. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 2008). 
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defendant’s behavior and may also be pleased not to fight a contested case.  
The judge is fully informed of all aspects of the plea and may even require 
an allocution to the “real” offense (drunk driving).  This practice is more 
prevalent in state courts than federal courts because it tends to occur with 
low-level crimes like misdemeanors, which are overwhelmingly before 
state courts.25 
My point is neither to condemn baseless pleas nor to extoll them but 
simply to point out that they are another example of how the criminal 
justice system is becoming more administrative and less adversarial.  The 
prosecutor, defense counsel, and trial court work out a creative and efficient 
resolution to a case, which is quite possibly more beneficial to all parties 
than a conviction or acquittal on the charged crime would be.  It is surely a 
creative solution and an example of the paradigm of administrative problem 
solving rather than the paradigm of justice through adversarial combat. 
C.  Restitution for Victims 
One of the assumptions underlying the adversarial model was that the 
prosecutor was entirely apolitical and the only factors she considered when 
determining whether and how to prosecute a case—or what plea to offer or 
accept—were the strength of the evidence, the severity of the crime, and the 
character of the defendant.26  The adversarial model is essentially binary—
the state represented by the prosecutor, versus the defendant represented by 
counsel, both exercising their professional judgment.  Law, at its highest 
level as conceived by the adversarial model, was distinct from politics.27 
In both state and federal criminal law, however, recent developments 
have given victims increasing roles, and they have become a constituency 
of the prosecutor.  For example, under federal law, the Criminal Victims’ 
Rights Act (CVRA) provides that crime victims have the right, among 
others, to (1) be “reasonably heard” at any hearing involving the accused’s 
release, plea, sentencing, or parole; (2) confer (reasonably) with the 
government attorney; (3) full and timely restitution “as provided in law”; 
and (4) proceedings “free from unreasonable delay.”28  The full scope of 
 
 25. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 21 (discussing predominantly state cases in the baseless 
pleas context).  Further, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 requires an allocution to the 
crime of conviction, which cannot be satisfied by a baseless plea. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 26. Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, for example, the sentence is largely 
determined based on the defendant’s provable “offense conduct” and his criminal history, 
which presumably reflects his character. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016); see also United States v. Shaygan, 652 F.3d 1297, 1326 
(11th Cir. 2011) (Edmondson, J., dissenting) (discussing the “Hyde Amendment,” which 
allows the court to award attorney’s fees to a defendant in criminal prosecutions that are 
brought in “bad faith” and stating that “the phrase ‘or in bad faith’ was intended to reach 
prosecutions conducted in a manner that was motivated by—and that demonstrated—
personal vindictiveness, personal ambition, politics, and so on”). 
 27. See, e,g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 383 (Alexander Hamilton) (Lawrence Goldman 
ed., 2008) (“[T]he courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited 
Constitution against legislative encroachments . . . .”). 
 28. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1)–(a)(8) (2012). 
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these rights is unclear, but together they provide victims an interest that the 
prosecutor must take into account when making decisions. 
To be sure, the CVRA expressly states that a victim whose rights have 
been denied has no cause of action for damages and further states that 
“[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial 
discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction.”29  It 
further provides that denial of any victim’s right is not grounds for granting 
a criminal defendant a new trial but may be grounds for reopening a plea or 
a sentence only if the victim was denied the right to be heard at the plea or 
sentencing proceeding.30  Nonetheless, the very fact that the CVRA 
contains these caveats demonstrates that the victim is intended to have some 
influence on the prosecutor; otherwise, the CVRA would be nugatory. 
Consider a case such as Doe v. United States,31 in which the prosecutor 
entered into a nonprosecution agreement with the potential defendant 
following an investigation regarding the sexual abuse of minors.32  This 
agreement provided that if the potential defendant engaged in no 
wrongdoing for a certain period following his entering into the agreement, 
he would not be charged for any of the investigated behavior.33  The 
prosecutor had not conferred with the alleged victims before entering the 
agreement, and two of the victims filed suit to enforce their right under the 
CVRA to obtain the correspondence between the government and potential 
defendant.34  The Eleventh Circuit held that the correspondence was not 
privileged and lifted the stay of the order compelling the disclosure of the 
correspondence.35  Presumably, the victims were then able to obtain the 
correspondence. 
The question here is not whether the decision was right or wrong, or even 
whether as a matter of policy victims should have the rights that the CVRA 
affords them.  The point is simply that the CVRA alters the relationship 
between prosecutors and defendants such that the adversarial model is not 
an accurate description of the reality of criminal prosecution. 
Perhaps the most important role of the victim in a criminal trial is during 
sentencing.  Victims have the right to be heard at sentencing,36 and while 
victims may often support the prosecution’s sentencing arguments and be 
called by prosecutors, their interests may not always align.  For example, 
prosecutors may wish to offer leniency to a defendant but victims may be 
less inclined to do so.  If the victim is given a right to appear at plea and 
 
 29. Id. § 3771(d)(6). 
 30. See id. § 3771(d)(5). 
 31. 749 F.3d. 999 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 32. See id. at 1002. 
 33. See id.  Note, however, that as part of the federal nonprosecution agreement, the 
potential defendant did agree to plead guilty to state offenses stemming from his conduct. Id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. at 1010. 
 36. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 60(a)(3) (“The court must permit a victim to be 
reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court concerning release, plea, or 
sentencing involving the crime.”). 
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sentencing hearings, then the balance between the prosecution and the 
defendant is affected. 
Restitution presents another clear example of how the adversarial model 
may no longer be complete.  The law mandates restitution for crime 
victims,37 but “victims” are defined quite broadly.38  In particular, courts 
have adopted a capacious definition for victims of a conspiracy,39 and given 
that the majority of federal criminal indictments include conspiracy 
charges,40 that capacious definition has significant consequences.  Thus, 
restitution folds more people into the criminal process than might have been 
contemplated under the adversarial model. 
In his 1976 article, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,” 
Abram Chayes showed how in many instances civil litigation had moved 
from the traditional binary model of party versus party to a model that 
allowed for judges’ consideration of the interests of many parties.41  The 
same may be happening in criminal law:  prosecutors no longer consider 
only the defendant and his actions, rather they consider those actions in 
conjunction with a set of other interests attributable to the victims. 
D.  Smarter Prosecutions 
Judge Lynch recognized that the existence of prosecutorial discretion 
contributed to the inquisitorial and administrative models of criminal 
justice.42  He demonstrated that limited resources required prosecutors to 
“triage” what cases they investigated and brought43 and that broad criminal 
statutes gave prosecutors flexibility in making prosecutorial decisions.44  
Rather than decry prosecutors’ discretion, Judge Lynch applauded it, 
arguing that prosecutorial discretion in enforcement allowed for a flexible 
and nuanced response to social attitudes.45  Prosecutorial discretion thus 
comported with Judge Lynch’s view that prosecutors should be thought of 
as administrative agencies that shape policy rather than as simply enforcers 
of a static and legislatively controlled criminal law. 
 
 37. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2012) (providing for “[m]andatory restitution to victims of 
certain crimes”). 
 38. See id. § 3771(e) (defining a “crime victim” as “a person directly and proximately 
harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense”); see also United States v. 
Amato, 540 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that employer was a victim and entitled to 
reimbursement from defendant for its expenses in conducting an internal investigation). 
 39. See, e.g., United States v. Jinwright, 683 F.3d 471, 485–86 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting 
that victims include even those outside the period of the alleged conspiracy and those who 
may have been harmed by conduct for which the defendant was acquitted). 
 40. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 919 F.2d 435, 439 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(“[P]rosecutors seem to have conspiracy on their word processors as Count I; rare is the case 
omitting such a charge.”). 
 41. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281, 1284 (1976). 
 42. See Lynch, supra note 1, at 2141–42. 
 43. See id. at 2136. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. at 2136–41. 
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Since Judge Lynch’s article, the breadth and number of criminal statutes 
has only grown, as has prosecutors’ discretion.46  Thus, the policymaking 
nature of prosecutors’ offices has become even more apparent.  Indeed, 
some New York City prosecutors have publicly announced that they will 
not prosecute the possession of small amounts of marijuana even though the 
written laws criminalize such possession.47  That is plainly a policy 
announcement in the form of prosecutorial discretion. 
My former boss, Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance, has been 
explicit about his view that being a prosecutor entails crafting social policy:  
“Philosophically, I really believe that a modern D.A.’s office’s job is 
reducing crime.  You do that by your work in the courtroom, you also do 
that by effective strategies out of the courtroom and in the community.”48  
Because Vance is the district attorney in a particularly visible and 
prominent county, his views are especially influential. 
Developments in criminology have allowed prosecutors to use their 
discretion to achieve great effect.  Gang prosecutions have been influenced 
by the belief that that criminal gangs often are led by relatively few people.  
Accordingly, to maximize increases in public safety resulting from 
prosecutions, prosecutors and police have employed tactics focused on 
arresting and jailing gang leaders.49  Focusing prosecutorial and police 
resources on the prosecution of such leaders is thus a good example of 
“smart prosecutions.” 50 
In addition, prosecutors throughout the country, often working with 
defense counsel and the courts, have devised “diversion” programs pursuant 
to which those who might otherwise be prosecuted—typically for relatively 
 
 46. Indeed, there are 27,000 pages of criminal laws in the U.S. Code. See Charles G. 
Koch & Mark V. Holden, The Overcriminalization of America, POLITICO (Jan. 7, 2015), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/overcriminalization-of-america-113991 
[https://perma.cc/W2GK-YGNY]; see also Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1100–01 
(2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting the “the real issue[s]” are “overcriminalization and 
excessive punishment in the U.S. Code,” and referring to overcriminalization and 
overpunishment as a “deep[] pathology in the federal criminal code”). 
 47. See, e.g., Stephanie Clifford & Joseph Goldstein, Brooklyn Prosecutor Limits When 
He’ll Target Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/ 
nyregion/brooklyn-district-attorney-to-stop-prosecuting-low-level-marijuana-cases.html 
[https://perma.cc/R6GP-KXG8]. 
 48. Megan Bungeroth, Fighting Crime from All Sides, W. SIDE SPIRIT (Jan. 15, 2015, 
11:45 AM) (emphasis added), http://www.westsidespirit.com/westys/20150115/fighting-
crime-from-all-sides [https://perma.cc/887T-VXB3]. 
 49. See Robert Vargas, Criminal Group Embeddedness and the Adverse Effects of 
Arresting a Gang’s Leader:  A Comparative Case Study, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 143, 143 (2014) 
(recognizing that law enforcement agencies aim to arrest gang leaders). See generally 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE POLICE-PROSECUTION 
PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE FY 2016 COMPETITIVE GRANT ANNOUNCEMENT (2016), 
https://www.bja.gov/funding/PPPI16.pdf (seeking to establish partnerships among 
prosecutors and police to promote smart prosecutions and giving examples of such 
prosecution strategies throughout the nation) [https://perma.cc/A58K-UQBD]. 
 50. Note, however, that some have questioned the efficacy of this tactic. See Vargas, 
supra note 49, at 143–44. 
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low-level drug offenses—agree to enter drug treatment programs.51  If the 
offenders graduate from the programs, they will not be prosecuted.52  These 
diversion programs frequently work in tandem with special courts created 
to solve particular problems.  For instance, veterans’ court, which deals 
with veterans who have been charged with certain offenses, or mental 
health court, which deals with defendants who have been criminally 
charged but who have significant mental health issues.53  The purpose of 
such courts, like the diversion programs, is to provide treatment for the 
defendants so that they may avoid criminal convictions. 
Prosecutors have even addressed problems of recidivism and the hurdles 
faced by convicted defendants after they complete their sentences.  For 
example, prosecutors have established programs to promote education in 
prison54 and to hire incarcerated individuals following their release.55 
E.  Discovery 
Criminal defendants have long had the right to discovery, although not 
nearly to the extent of discovery in civil cases.56  Defendants’ right to 
criminal discovery has grown in response to a recent spate of judicial 
decisions and articles decrying as “crises” the failure of the government in 
numerous cases to disclose exculpatory evidence.57 
In response to the concerns about discovery failures, more prosecutors 
are providing “open-file” discovery to defendants.  While the exact 
contours of open-file discovery programs may differ among jurisdictions, 
such programs typically direct the prosecutor to turn over his entire case file 
 
 51. See generally CTR. FOR HEALTH & JUSTICE AT TASC, NO ENTRY:  A NATIONAL 
SURVEY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DIVERSION PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES (2013), 
http://www2.centerforhealthandjustice.org/sites/www2.centerforhealthandjustice.org/files/pu
blications/CHJ%20Diversion%20Report_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/L24M-7SZS]; CTR. FOR 
PRISON REFORM, DIVERSION PROGRAMS IN AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:  A REPORT 
BY THE CENTER FOR PRISON REFORM (2015), https://centerforprisonreform.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/Jail-Diversion-Programs-in-America.pdf [https://perma.cc/3G8N-
DDQH]. 
 52. See generally CTR. FOR HEALTH & JUSTICE AT TASC, supra note 51. 
 53. See, e.g., Erin R. Collins, Status Courts, 105 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) 
(describing the evolution and proliferation of problem-solving courts). 
 54. See, e.g., Kamala D. Harris, Shut the Revolving Door of Prison, in SOLUTIONS:  
AMERICAN LEADERS SPEAK OUT ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 37 (Inimai Chettiar & Michael 
Waldman eds., 2d ed. 2015). 
 55. See, e.g., Rich Lord, Pittsburgh’s U.S. Attorney Urges Employers to Hire Ex-
Offenders, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (May 20, 2013, 7:40 PM), http://www.post-gazette.com/ 
local/region/2013/05/20/Pittsburgh-s-U-S-Attorney-urges-employers-to-hire-ex-offenders/ 
stories/201305200114 [https://perma.cc/9L9A-BF2M]. 
 56. For example, criminal defendants, unlike civil litigants, cannot take depositions of 
witnesses, issue interrogatories to their adversaries, make document demands, or issue broad 
subpoenas to nonparties. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 15–17, with FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37. 
 57. See, e.g., United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“There is an epidemic of Brady violations 
abroad in the land.”). 
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to the defendant regardless of whether the defendant would have a right to 
the materials under the constitution or any applicable rule.58 
There are typically limits.  For example, if turning over materials would 
endanger a witness, then the prosecutor may seek a protective order from 
the court to avoid turning them over.59  Also, the definition of the “file” 
may not be clear in all cases, especially in long-running investigations.  
Furthermore, even an open-file discovery program may not avoid all Brady 
errors.  Although the prosecutor’s Brady obligation applies to exculpatory 
information, material exculpatory evidence not reduced to a written form 
may not be in the case file.60  Even with these limits, open-file discovery is 
still far removed from the adversarial system, and while there may not be a 
precisely analogous procedure in administrative law, it carries with it a 
collaborative element that is more akin to administrative law than to 
traditional criminal practice.61 
F.  Conviction Integrity Units 
With rare and notorious exceptions, every prosecutor wishes to get 
convictions right; no prosecutor wants to send the innocent to jail.  And, 
prosecutors have always been reasonably confident that they have “gotten it 
right.”  It was only after the development and spread of DNA testing in the 
last fifteen to twenty years that prosecutors began to realize that they may 
not have been right as invariably as they had thought.62 
The adversarial means of addressing the realization that wrongful 
convictions are more frequent than previously believed would be to do 
nothing.  After all, innocent people wrongly convicted can and do petition 
 
 58. Open-file discovery in criminal cases has long had adherents, including two of the 
more notable jurists of the twentieth century. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal 
Prosecution:  Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279; Roger J. 
Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 228 (1964).  
Calls for open-file discovery have been more insistent recently as evidence of prosecutorial 
errors has increased. See Brian P. Fox, Note, An Argument Against Open-File Discovery in 
Criminal Cases, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425, 426 & n.5 (2013) (noting the upsurge in 
articles discussing open-file discovery in the wake of the Duke lacrosse case). 
 59. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d). 
 60. For example, if a witness makes an unrecorded remark that tends to exculpate the 
defendant. 
 61. See generally Laurie L. Levenson, Discovery from the Trenches:  The Future of 
Brady, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 74, 76 (2013) (“No matter what the case law may 
suggest, there is a right and a wrong way to conduct discovery.  The wrong way is to cling to 
the notion that the adversarial system should guide how prosecutors and defense lawyers 
approach their discovery duties.  The right way is to open a dialogue so that both sides can 
work cooperatively to ensure a fair trial.”).  Leaving aside Professor Levenson’s 
characterization of a right and wrong way, she correctly identifies the shift in the discovery 
discussion from an adversarial to a collaborative model. 
 62. See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 56 (2008) 
(“Actors in the criminal system long doubted whether courts ever wrongly convicted 
people . . . .”); Richard A. Leo & John B. Gould, Studying Wrongful Convictions:  Learning 
from Social Science, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 8 (2009). 
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for habeas relief,63 and many state statutes give convicted persons a right to 
DNA testing in at least some circumstances.64  The role of the prosecutor 
could be, and for some time has been, simply to respond appropriately to 
habeas petitions. 
But, an increasing number of prosecutors’ offices have taken proactive 
administrative steps to address the problem of wrongful convictions.  Most 
importantly, many prosecutors’ offices have created “conviction integrity 
units” that are devoted to identifying and remedying wrongful convictions 
often without the need for the petitioner to file a habeas petition.65  The 
conviction integrity units, although part of the prosecutors’ offices, have a 
different focus than the line prosecutors and generally a different mind-set.  
They are almost ombudsmen for the offices and are intended to be less 
adversarial than archetypal prosecutors.  Several of the units engage in joint 
reinvestigations, pursuant to which they reinvestigate old or suspect 
convictions jointly with defense counsel.66  Indeed, such measures are 
welcome steps toward alleviating wrongful convictions. 
III.  HOW THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM TOOK HOLD 
I often hear veteran prosecutors say that the role of the prosecutor is 
getting bigger and bigger.67  There are myriad issues that prosecutors deal 
with today—including how to address recidivism, what to do about the 
disparity in incarceration rates between persons of color and whites, how 
forfeiture funds should be used, and whether records of youthful 
convictions should be expunged or sealed—that until recently were not 
 
 63. See, e.g., People v. Hamilton, 979 N.Y.S.2d 97, 107–09 (App. Div. 2014) 
(recognizing that defendants may assert a cognizable claim of actual innocence on collateral 
review). 
 64. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(g-1) (McKinney Supp. 2017) 
(providing for a right to postconviction DNA testing under certain circumstances). 
 65. According to the National Registry of Exonerations, the number of conviction 
integrity units “has grown rapidly in the past six years.  There were 24 [conviction integrity 
units] in the United States in 2015, double the number in 2013 and quadruple the number in 
2011.” NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, CONVICTION INTEGRITY UNITS 1 (2016), 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/2.2016_Newsletter_Art2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5E8T-EUUS]. 
 66. See, e.g., John Hollway, Conviction Review Units:  A National Perspective 48–52 
(Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 15-41, 
2016), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1614 [https://perma.cc/8GQR-
35JN].  In fact, they even interview witnesses together and may share documentary evidence. 
See id. 
 67. Cf. Lauren-Brooke “L.B.” Eisen, Prosecutors Can Play Role in Ending Mass 
Incarceration, BRENNAN CTR. (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/ 
prosecutors-can-play-role-ending-mass-incarceration (“Th[e] new theory of prosecution has 
three overarching goals:  reducing violence and serious crime; reducing prison populations; 
and reducing recidivism.”) [https://perma.cc/9H2A-YRBN]; Jennifer Polish, The Role of 
Prosecutors as Social Justice Advocates, LAW STREET (June 16, 2015), 
https://lawstreetmedia.com/issues/law-and-politics/role-of-prosecutors-as-social-justice-
advocates/ (“The immense racial disparities in charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing are 
all directly traceable to prosecutors’ structurally informed choices.”) 
[https://perma.cc/W9WT-KS6T]. 
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significant issues for prosecutors.  This observation ties in neatly with 
Judge Lynch’s observation that criminal procedure is becoming more 
administrative than allowed for in the adversarial model.  The issues faced 
by prosecutors are not ones that succumb to a simple prosecutor versus 
defendant model. 
How did we get here?  I believe that the answer begins with the 
observation that criminal justice is, at its core, one form of social control 
and that it is compensating for other means of social control, like family, 
community, and societal mores, which have proven insufficient to the task.  
Political scientist Samuel Huntington observed that unlike any other 
country in the world, the United States was defined not by ethnicity, 
religion, or a deep, shared history.  Rather, its origins as a country of 
immigrants made it a country based on one idea:  equality.68  And because 
that idea is given content largely through laws, Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
famous observation that in the United States almost every issue eventually 
becomes a legal one,69 has proven to be true.  It may be that the criminal 
justice system is tasked with addressing too many iterations of socially 
undesirable behavior, perhaps because the deep social constraints often 
found in other societies are lacking here.  It is unclear whether the criminal 
justice system can bear the strain but the effort to do so has caused it to 
explore methods other than those that can be accommodated by the 
adversarial model. 
Added to this is the recognition that prosecutors’ offices are themselves a 
bureaucracy.  Prosecutors never identify themselves as bureaucrats; they 
invariably distinguish themselves from the administrators in other parts of 
state or federal government.  The distinction, however, may not be as clean 
as they like to believe.  The prosecutorial office is a bureaucratic agency 
and, like any such agency, it seeks both to aggrandize its own power and to 
influence the behavior of the people who man it.  As a consequence, 
prosecutorial offices become involved in the whorl of issues that surround 
criminal justice—recidivism, the expenditure of forfeited funds, and the 
disparity in criminal prosecution rates between persons of color and 
whites—and those issues are simply not amenable to the adversarial system. 
IV.  SHORTCOMINGS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM AND STEPS 
MOVING FORWARD 
What consequence follows the shift from the adversarial system toward 
the administrative system of criminal justice? 
First, we should look to legislative and rule-based sources for changes in 
criminal justice, rather than to changes in constitutional doctrine.  To be 
sure, since Judge Lynch’s article, the U.S. Supreme Court has strengthened 
 
 68. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS:  THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY 
23–30 (1981). 
 69. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (J.P. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence trans., HarperPerrenial 1988) (1835) (“There is hardly a political question in the 
United States which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one.”). 
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defendants’ rights in connection with pleas.  In Padilla v. Kentucky,70 
Lafler v. Cooper,71 and Missouri v. Frye,72 the Supreme Court recognized 
defendants’ rights to have the immigration consequences of their plea 
explained to them by their counsel,73 to have plea offers communicated to 
them,74 and to receive competent advice with respect to those offers.75  The 
content of these rights is, for present purposes, less important than the fact 
that the Supreme Court recognized them—really created them out of the 
right to counsel of the Sixth Amendment—and therefore fashioned what 
Justice Antonin Scalia scornfully called “a whole new field of 
constitutionalized criminal procedure:  plea-bargaining law.”76 
But, constitutional rules can expand only so far, and to ensure that pleas 
lead to a suitable form of justice it would be appropriate to consider what 
nonconstitutional rules might be adopted.  Plea procedures used in various 
prosecutorial districts could be studied systematically to see if there are 
preferred practices in some that should be adopted by all.  For example, 
some prosecutorial offices may have a higher percentage of cases that plead 
than other offices.  It is hard to say ex ante whether one percentage would 
be too high or another too low, but the comparison might be instructive.  In 
addition, there might be changes to procedures that would enhance the 
integrity of pleas and guard against those that are coerced by the draconian 
risks of going to trial.77 
Further, each of the areas discussed above might be explored by 
appropriate legislative or rulemaking authorities.  Victims’ rights, including 
restitution, have historically been statutory and have increased 
tremendously over the last thirty years.78  Some states have already passed 
laws or enacted procedural rules that expand discovery, and at least one 
 
 70. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 71. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
 72. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
 73. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (holding that at minimum clients have the right to 
counsel who tell them if their pleas will result in deportation). 
 74. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408. 
 75. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388. 
 76. See id. at 1391 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 77. See Donald A. Dripps, Guilt, Innocence, and Due Process of Plea Bargaining, 57 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1384–92 (2016); see also United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 
2d 417, 419–20 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing how prosecutors use the threat of filing prior 
felony informations to pressure defendants to plead guilty), aff’d, 616 F. App’x 33 (2d Cir. 
2015). 
 78. See, e.g., About Victims’ Rights, VICTIMLAW, https://www.victimlaw.org/victimlaw/ 
pages/victimsRight.jsp (last visited Mar. 8, 2017) (“Thirty years ago, victims had few legal 
rights to be informed, present, and heard within the criminal justice system . . . .  Since then, 
there have been tremendous strides in the creation of legal rights and assistance programs for 
victims of crime.  Today, every state, the District of Columbia, and several territories have 
an extensive body of basic rights and protections for victims of crime within its statutory 
code.  Victims’ rights statutes have significantly influenced the manner in which victims are 
treated within the federal, state, and local criminal justice systems.”) [https://perma.cc/SQ5S-
ZBGD]. 
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state expressly requires open-file discovery.79  Smarter prosecutions would 
be promoted if legislatures pared away lesser criminal offenses, which 
currently occupy the time and resources of police, prosecutors, and courts, 
such that resources could be focused on more significant targets.  The 
increase in the number of conviction integrity units is not the result of 
legislation but of the steady drumbeat of advocates who have established 
that the number of wrongfully convicted people is greater than previously 
believed.  Still, it too would be amenable to legislation. 
Regardless of whether any particular reforms in these areas are wise or 
adopted, it appears clear that legislative action is required to improve the 
criminal justice system, for it has changed from the adversarial system 
envisioned by the Constitution.  Legislators who enact reforms should do so 
with full acknowledgement of the administrative nature of our system of 
justice. 
 
 79. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(1) (2016) (“Upon motion of the defendant, 
the court must order . . . [t]he State to make available to the defendant the complete files of 
all law enforcement agencies, investigatory agencies, and prosecutors’ offices involved in 
the investigation of the crimes committed or the prosecution of the defendant.”). 
